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Abstract: In July 1925, the psychiatrist Albert Moll appeared before
the district court in Berlin-Sch¨ oneberg charged with having defamed
the medium Maria Vollhardt (alias Rudloff) in his 1924 book Der
Spiritismus [Spiritism]. Supported by some of Berlin’s most prominent
occultists, the plaintiff – the medium’s husband – argued that Moll’s
use of terms such as ‘trick’, ‘manipulation’ and ‘farce’ in reference to
Vollhardt’s phenomena had been libellous. In the three-part trial that
followed, however, Moll’s putative affront to the medium – of which
he was eventually acquitted – was overshadowed, on the one hand, by
a debate over the scientiﬁc status of parapsychology, and on the other,
by the question of who – parapsychologists, occultists, psychiatrists or
jurists – was entitled to claim epistemic authority over the occult. This
paper will use the Rudloff–Moll trial as a means of examining Moll’s
critique of occultism, not only as it stood in the mid-1920s, but also as it
had developed since the 1880s. It will also provide insight into the views
of Germany’s occultists and parapsychologists, who argued that their
legitimate bid for scientiﬁc credibility was hindered by Dunkelm anner
[obscurantists] such as Albert Moll.
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Introduction
In July 1925, the psychiatrist Albert Moll appeared before the district court in
Berlin-Sch¨ oneberg charged with having defamed the apport medium Maria Vollhardt
– pseudonym of Maria Rudloff.1 The plaintiff, Hermann Rudloff – the medium’s husband
– claimed that the defendant’s use of terms such as ‘trick’, ‘manipulation’ and ‘farce’
in his 1924 book, Der Spiritismus [Spiritism] – a brief section of which, entitled ‘Das
Apportmedium’ [‘The Apport Medium’], described a sitting with Frau Vollhardt – had
 Email address for correspondence: heather.wolffram@canterbury.ac.nz
1 The term ‘apport’ refers to the paranormal transference of objects from one place to another or the appearance
of articles from unknown sources in the presence of a medium. Maria Vollhardt specialised in apports, including
hoops, branches and ﬂowers.278 Heather Wolram
been libellous.2 While Moll had not explicitly used the words ‘deception’ or ‘fraud’ in
his depiction of the medium’s phenomena, Rudloff maintained that these accusations
had nonetheless been clear, causing profound damage to his wife’s reputation.3 He was
supported in this contention by some of Berlin’s most prominent parapsychologists,
several of whom had been present at the experiment Moll’s book described. These
parapsychologists claimed that the defendant, mistaking personal attack for scientiﬁc
critique, was responsible for the coarse tone of debate which now plagued their ﬁeld.4
Presented with this argument, the presiding judge, one Herr Bornemann, was required
to decide whether Moll’s portrayal of Frau Vollhardt met the criteria for defamation as
set out under Sections 186 and 187 of the Republic’s penal code.5 As Judge Bornemann
soon discovered, however, the Rudloff–Moll case was rather more complex than it
ﬁrst appeared. In a context in which the reality of the central phenomena, that is,
apports, materialisation and stigmata, were debated and in which the issues of epistemic
authority and expertise over these phenomena were highly contested, ascertaining whether
the outspoken defendant was guilty of defaming the medium or of overstepping the
acceptable bounds of critique within the nascent ﬁeld of parapsychology would not be
straightforward.6
Moll’s annotated reproduction in Der Spiritismus of a protocol derived from Friedrich
Schwab’s book Teleplasma und Telekinese [Teleplasm and Telekinesis] (1923) had
provided a thoroughgoing critique of an experiment conducted by Berlin’s leading
occultists – including the doctors Carl Bruck and Paul S¨ unner, members of the  Arztliche
Gesellschaft f ur parapsychische Forschung [Medical Society for Parapsychological
Research] – on 11 April 1923.7 In part, this critique sought to demonstrate the manner
in which Vollhardt’s phenomena, in particular the appearance of wooden hoops on the
arms of those acting as her controls, could be achieved manually, that is, through skilful
‘trick’ and ‘manipulation’. With reference to both the art of conjuring and the psychology
of observation, Moll argued that in this instance the medium had most probably slipped
the hoops onto her arms before control of her hands had been established, but after the
room had been darkened.8 He maintained, furthermore, that the transfer of the hoops
onto the arms of Vollhardt’s controls had undoubtedly occurred as she underwent the
2 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, Psychische Studien, 52 (1925), 550–8; Albert Moll, Der Spiritismus, 2nd edn
(Stuttgart: Franckh’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1924), 36–48.
3 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 552.
4 Albert Moll, Ein Leben als Arzt der Seele: Erinnerungen (Dresden: Carl Reissner, 1936), 106. On Moll’s
confusion of personal attack with scientiﬁc critique, see Walther Kr¨ oner, ‘Epilog zur Moll-Polemik’, Zeitschrift
f ur Parapsychologie, 3 (1926), 160–9.
5 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 552. The Strafgesetzbuch states the following: ‘Section 186:
Defamation: Whosoever asserts or disseminates a fact related to another person which may defame him or
negatively affect public opinion about him, shall, unless this fact can be proven to be true, be liable to
imprisonment of not more than one year or a ﬁne and, if the offence was committed publicly or through the
dissemination of written materials (Section 11 (3)), to imprisonment of not more than two years or a ﬁne.
Section 187: Intentional defamation: Whosoever intentionally and knowingly asserts or disseminates an untrue
fact related to another person, which may defame him or negatively affect public opinion about him or endanger
his creditworthiness shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than two years or a ﬁne, and, if the act was
committed publicly, in a meeting or through dissemination of written materials (Section 11 (3)) to imprisonment
of not more than ﬁve years or a ﬁne’.
6 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 552, 554–5. Note that, like Moll, I will use the terms ‘occultist’
and ‘parapsychologist’ as well as ‘occultism’ and ‘parapsychology’ interchangeably in this paper.
7 Friederich Schwab, Teleplasma und Telekinese: Ergebnisse meiner zweij ahrigen Experimentalsitzungen mit
dem Berliner Medium Maria Vollhart (Berlin: Pyramidenverlag, 1923); Moll, op. cit. (note 2), 37–40.
8 Moll, ibid., 38, 40–1.`Trick', `Manipulation' and `Farce' 279
convulsions that routinely accompanied the production of her mediumistic phenomena.9
To demonstrate the ease with which Vollhardt could have escaped her controls Moll
also provided several illustrations, derived from contemporary works in the ﬁeld of
parapsychology, in which the mediums pictured successfully freed their hands from those
who were holding them.10
The other, and perhaps more signiﬁcant, purpose of Moll’s critique, however, was to
highlight the profound, even ‘farcical’, lack of scientiﬁc rigour exhibited by Berlin’s
foremost parapsychologists. From the opening pages of Der Spiritismus, Moll’s desire
to undermine the scientiﬁc pretensions of this community had been clear.11 In the
introductory section, he noted that the term ‘occultism’ had, in recent times, been used
to refer to the practice of spiritualism: a belief system based on the idea that spirits are
able to communicate with human beings.12 Moll wrote that it appeared to him that some
people chose to use the terms ‘occultism’ and ‘parapsychology’ because they did not
want to admit to being spiritualists.13 Thus, at the beginning of his second chapter, Moll
declared his intention of providing descriptions of some of the experiments held by these
putative occultists; such depictions, he stated, would make the true – that is spiritualist
– nature of these sittings clear.14 The heavily annotated protocol at the centre of the
Rudloff–Moll trial, which appeared in the seventh chapter of Moll’s book, clearly served
this purpose. Full of righteous indignation, Moll wrote: ‘the experiments were made under
such incredibly thoughtless conditions that one can only speak of a farce. The medium
was not searched beforehand.... That is what the Berlin occultists call science!’15 While
Schwab had published this same protocol believing that its veriﬁcation by the doctors and
psychiatrists who had been in attendance made it signiﬁcant, Moll commented snidely
that its true importance lay in its documentation of the mental state of Berlin’s leading
occultists. He stated, ‘I have only used the experiment and my remarks about it therefore
because they quickly cast light on the mental state of the leaders of Berlin occultism. The
trick is so crude that the whole case only deserves consideration because of the frame of
mind of the occultists.’16
Following three days (4, 8 and 11 July 1925) of arguments and expert testimony,
which included close analysis of Der Spiritismus, and long discussions about the scientiﬁc
validity of the 11 April 1923 sitting, Judge Bornemann found Moll not guilty of defaming
Maria Vollhardt, ordering the litigant to pay the cost of the proceedings. In his lengthy
justiﬁcation of this ruling, Bornemann stressed several of the key issues in deciding the
defendant’s lack of culpability. The ﬁrst was that Moll’s sharp critique had essentially
not been directed at Frau Vollhardt but at those who had participated in the sitting, in
9 Ibid., 38.
10 Ibid., 43, 45, 46.
11 This point was made by Carl Bruck in his introduction to what he claimed was a more accurate protocol of
the 11 April 1923 sitting with Frau Vollhardt. See, Carl Bruck, ‘Ein Protokoll’, Psychische Studien, 51 (1924),
481–7.
12 Moll, op. cit. (note 2), 4, 8.
13 Ibid., 9.
14 Ibid., 20.
15 ‘Die Versuche sind unter so unerh¨ ort leichtfertigen Bedinungen angestellt, daß man nur von einer Farce
sprechen kann. Das Medium ist vorher nicht untersucht worden ...Das nennen die Berliner Okkultisten
Wissenschaft!’ Ibid., 42. Translations of quotations are the author’s unless stated otherwise.
16 ‘Ich habe den Versuch und meine Bemerkungen dazu nur deshalb gebracht, weil sie blitzartig den
Geisteszustand von F¨ uhrern des Berliner Okkultismus beleuchten. Der Trick ist so plump, daß der ganze Fall
nur wegen der Geistesverfassung der Okkultisten Beachtung verdient’. Ibid., 42.280 Heather Wolram
particular Carl Bruck and Paul S¨ unner, who had acted as the medium’s controls.17 In
Moll’s opinion, these men had not exercised the scientiﬁc rigour or objectivity necessary
to exclude either sensory deception or fraud from this experiment; a problem that, he
maintained, was typical in occult circles.18 Furthermore, the use of the word ‘farce’, as
Bornemann indicated, did not refer to the medium but to the conditions under which the
experiment had been conducted. It was therefore far more an attack on the credibility of
Berlin’s occultists than it was on the reputation of the medium.19
The second issue highlighted by Bornemann was the applicability of Sections 186 and
187 of the penal code to this case. While the pertinence of Section 187 was dependent
on the defendant disseminating ‘untrue facts’ about another person, under Section 186
it was sufﬁcient that the ‘facts’ disseminated were not proven to be true.20 In the
Rudloff–Moll case, this meant that it was necessary for the judge to decide whether the
‘trick’ and ‘manipulation’ claimed by the defendant, which he had stated as fact rather
than hypothesis, could be established given the evidence in hand.21 For this reason, he
was required carefully to assess the sitting of 11 April using evidence provided, not only
by those who had participated in it, but also by expert witnesses in areas such as occultism,
conjuring and psychology. This task was complicated, however, by Moll’s assertion that
the phenomena that Vollhardt claimed to produce, in particular apport and materialisation,
were scientiﬁcally impossible. As Bornemann noted, Moll’s use of expert witnesses to
provide evidence for this claim necessitated entry into the broader scientiﬁc dispute over
whether occult events and phenomena were possible, impossible or already proven.22
According to the judge, the exposition of this debate served to demonstrate that, in
contrast to many other scientiﬁc ﬁelds, a fundamental opposition existed within the ﬁeld of
parapsychology between those who were sceptical of all occult experiments and theories
and those who wholeheartedly believed in them without compelling scientiﬁc evidence.
After having reviewed all this material, however, Bornemann found himself concluding
that the accusation of deception in the sitting of 11 April 1923 could be neither proven
nor disproven. This meant that Moll’s statements did not qualify as ‘untrue facts’ and he
could not be charged with defamation under Section 187.23 The conditions for defamation
under Section 186, in contrast, had been fulﬁlled because the medium’s deception could
not be deﬁnitively proven. As the judge made clear, however, Moll was protected from
prosecution under Section 186 by Section 193, which dealt with fair comment.24 The
parts of the defendant’s book that were in question, he stated, were within the realm of
acceptable scientiﬁc critique.25
17 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 552.
18 Ibid., 552.
19 Ibid., 552.
20 Ibid., 552–3.
21 The plaintiff argued that Moll had stated as fact that the medium had pushed the wooden hoops onto the
arms of her controls. This, he said, amounted to accusing her of deception. Bornemann was thus concerned with
establishing whether such deception could be proven. See, ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 552.
22 Ibid., 554.
23 Ibid., 557.
24 §193 reads: ‘Fair comment; defence: Critical opinions about scientiﬁc, artistic or commercial achievements,
utterancesmadeinordertoexerciseorprotectrightsortosafeguardlegitimateinterests,aswellasremonstrations
and reprimands by superiors to their subordinates, ofﬁcial reports or judgements by a civil servant, and similar
cases shall only entail liability to the extent that the existence of an insult results from the form of the utterance
or the circumstances under which it was made’.
25 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 557–8.`Trick', `Manipulation' and `Farce' 281
Following this clariﬁcation, Bornemann considered two further questions; these related
ﬁrst to Moll’s decision to ignore information that contradicted his claims, and second
to his ostensible insult of the medium (Section 185).26 On the basis of Schwab’s
protocol, Moll had given a talk at the Berliner forensisch-medizinische Vereinigung
[Berlin Medical{Forensic Club] in October 1923 in which he claimed to replicate, via a
series of conjuring tricks, some of Frau Vollhardt’s phenomena. Approximately two weeks
after this performance, he received a telephone call from Dr Bruck, who had been one of
the controls at the disputed sitting. Bruck told Moll that Schwab’s protocol contained
errors, including, most signiﬁcantly, the contention that the control of the medium’s hands
had been established only after the lights were extinguished.27 Despite this information,
Moll reiterated his claims of ‘trick’ and ‘manipulation’ and re-printed Schwab’s protocol
in Der Spiritismus. He claimed that Bruck’s failure to put his objections in writing gave
him the right to ignore this information. While Bornemann felt that this probably did
constitute ‘insult in the circumstances’, the expert witnesses’ division on whether Moll
could be said to have acted properly or professionally did not allow him to rule with any
certainty on this issue.28
The last question on which Bornemann had to make a decision was whether Moll’s use
of the terms ‘trick’ and ‘manipulation’ constituted an insult to the medium, given that they
could be read as intimating fraud (Section 185). Under other circumstances, the judge
claimed, these words would certainly meet the criteria. In this context, however, where
the defendant was talking about manual manipulation, the word ‘manipulation’ appeared
to be synonymous with ‘movement’ and the word ‘trick’ with ‘artiﬁcial’.29 Furthermore,
as the judge pointed out, occult and spiritualist literature also frequently used this same
nomenclature; even occultists, it appeared, held that mediums might, on some occasions,
create their phenomena artiﬁcially. In this instance, therefore, it was the judge’s opinion
that neither of these terms could be considered defamatory.30
In spite of Bornemann’s thoroughgoing explanation of his decision, the outcome of
the Rudloff–Moll trial proved disappointing for all those involved: Rudloff continued to
believe that his wife had been unjustly maligned by Moll; the occultists Bruck and S¨ unner,
at whom Moll’s critique appeared primarily to be aimed, complained not just that the
defendanthadgonebeyondtheboundsofacceptablecritique,butthattheirnascentscience
had also not been given adequate opportunity to defend itself against Moll’s unwarranted
attacks;31 while Moll, for his part, disputed the grounds of his acquittal under Section 193,
contending that it was not possible to commit libel, as he had been found guilty of doing
under Section 186, in a context in which the reality of the phenomena in question remained
open.32 Given this widespread dissatisfaction with the verdict, it is perhaps unsurprising
that the Rudloff–Moll case appeared twice more before the courts, in December 1925
and in September 1926. Each new appeal added to the bitterness of the ﬁery polemics
26 Ibid., 558. §185 states: ‘Insult: An insult shall be punished with imprisonment of not more than one year or a
ﬁne and, if the insult is committed by means of an assault, with imprisonment of not more than two years or a
ﬁne’.
27 Albert Moll, Psychologie und Charakterologie der Okkultisten (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1929), 67.
28 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 558.
29 Ibid., 558.
30 Ibid., 558.
31 E. Dreher, ‘Nachkl¨ ange zum ‘Okkultisten-Prozeß’, Psychische Studien, 52 (1925), 545–50: 545, 548.
32 Eberhard Buchner, ‘Der Mollprozeß in zweiter Auﬂage’, Zeitschrift f ur Parapsychologie, 3 (1926), 154–9:
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between those who sided with the prosecution, that is, Germany’s parapsychologists, and
those who supported the defence, that is, Moll and others critical of so-called scientiﬁc
occultism. In both instances, however, and much to the chagrin of his opponents within
the parapsychological community, Moll was acquitted of all charges.
Clearly, in all three iterations of this trial, the defendant’s putative affront to the medium
was not the central issue; that question was continually overshadowed, on the one hand, by
debateoverthescientiﬁcstatusofparapsychology,andontheother,bythequestionofwho
– parapsychologists, occultists, psychiatrists, or jurists – was entitled to claim epistemic
authority over the occult. Thus, it seems that the Rudloff–Moll trial provides insight, not
just into a petty personal dispute, but also into the largely intractable problems surrounding
parapsychology’s bid for scientiﬁc status in the early twentieth century, as well as the
efforts of other disciplines, including psychology, psychiatry and law, to claim the ﬁeld as
their own. It also offers insight into the intellectual world and the intellectual development
of its central protagonist, Albert Moll. His life-long interest in occultism saw him become
one of the most important, albeit most critical, ﬁgures within the late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century German debate over spiritualism, occultism, psychical research
and parapsychology.
It is my intention in this paper to use the Rudloff–Moll trial as a means of examining
Moll’s critique of occultism, not only as it stood in the mid-1920s, but also as it had
developed since the 1880s.33 The opinions that Moll expressed in the course of this
trial, as he himself told the court, were the culmination of four decades of observation
and experimentation in the ﬁeld of occultism.34 Indeed, I will argue that his use of
the terms at the centre of this case, that is, ‘trick’, ‘manipulation’ and ‘farce’, reﬂected
his slow evolution from a psychological to a pathological model of occultism; that is,
from an understanding of occultism that sought to explain it in terms of inattention
and observational error to one that attempted to explain it in terms of both the ﬂawed
scientiﬁc objectivity and mental pathology of its proponents. This trial, then, in which
Moll questioned the mental state of Berlin’s leading parapsychologists, can be read as
marking the transition between, or fusion of, these approaches; a process that was perhaps
only fully realised in his 1929 book Psychologie und Charakterologie der Okkultisten
[Psychology and Characterology of the Occultists].
This article will also demonstrate the manner in which the subjects of Moll’s critique,
who published furiously in periodicals such as Psychische Studien [Psychical Studies] and
Zeitschrift f ur Parapsychologie [Journal for Parapsychology] during the Rudloff–Moll
affair, mounted a defence against his psychological and psychopathological attacks;
33 Occult trials have proven to be useful sources for historians working on both the history of occultism and on
criminal justice in the German context. Of particular note is the work of Corinna Treitel and Benjamin Carter
Hett on the early twentieth-century trial of the medium Anna Rothe. Treitel has discussed this case as part of
her exploration of the relationship between occultism and modernity in Germany, while Hett has considered the
Rothe trial in his cultural–historical analysis of criminal trials in Imperial Berlin. Both scholars considered this
trial as a manifestation of liberal despair over public credulity and the popularisation of science. See Corinna
Treitel, ‘The culture of knowledge in the metropolis of science: spiritualism and liberalism in Fin-de-Si` ecle
Berlin’, in Constantin Goschler (ed.), Wissenschaft und  Offentlichkeit in Berlin (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2000),
127–54; Benjamin Carter-Hett, Death in the Tiergarten: Murder and Criminal Justice in the Kaiser's Berlin
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 153–5. I have tended to approach occult trials in another
way, using them to tease out the epistemic and methodological issues surrounding parapsychology’s bid for
scientiﬁc status. See, Heather Wolffram, The Stepchildren of Science: Psychical Research and Parapsychology
in Germany, c. 1870{1939 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009), especially Chapter Five. In this paper, however, I take a
slightly different approach and use the trial to gain deeper insight into one man’s critique.
34 Buchner, op. cit. (note 32), 155; Kr¨ oner, op. cit. (note 4), 161.`Trick', `Manipulation' and `Farce' 283
turning Moll’s own past as a champion of hypnosis and his ‘grubby’ psychopathological
tactics against him. Moll, they contended, as a participant in the Hypnose-Kampf
[Hypnosis Battle] of the late nineteenth century, should have some appreciation of
the difﬁculties of establishing disputed scientiﬁc phenomena.35 Materialisation and
telekinesis, they maintained, stood in the same relationship to the science of the early
twentieth century as hypnosis had stood to the science of the fin de si ecle.36 Furthermore,
in response to Moll’s psychopathological attacks on their credibility, they argued that
Dunkelm anner such as Albert Moll felt it necessary to hinder parapsychology’s legitimate
bid for scientiﬁc status as a result of compulsions that could only be understood by
considering their deep-seated neuroses and inferiority complexes.37
Thus, in this article, the Rudloff–Moll trial and the literature it produced will act as
lenses through which to assess Moll’s critique of occultism and its evolution over several
decades, as well as the responses of his opponents to his brand of aggressive scientiﬁc
discourse. In adopting this approach I hope to build on the work of Barbara Wolf-
Braun, who has described Moll’s mobilisation of naturalistic explanations for paranormal
phenomena during the 1890s as an act of sanitisation, that is, as an attempt to maintain a
critical distance between the emergent ﬁelds in which he had a professional stake, such
as psychology and experimental and therapeutic hypnosis, and the taint of occultism.38
Like Wolf-Braun, I will maintain that Moll’s critique of occultism was motivated by
the epistemic and professional contest that occurred between the emerging disciplines
of psychology and parapsychology during the Kaiserreich. Using the Rudloff–Moll
trial, however, I will extend Wolf-Braun’s analysis to show how this contest developed
during the Weimar years, demonstrating the manner in which its proponents, responding
to developments within their ﬁelds and ongoing debate with their enemies, became
increasingly dedicated to a form of boundary work that sought to undermine the authority
and credibility of opponents, both through their re-subjectiﬁcation as critical scientiﬁc
observers and through their psycho-pathologisation.39
The article will begin by focusing on Moll’s accusations of ‘trick’ and ‘manipulation’
in the 11 April 1923 sitting he described in his book, and his demonstrations of occult
phenomena in the courtroom, as a means of reﬂecting on the development of his early
psychological analyses of the occult. In the second section, I will consider the contention
of ‘farce’ during the trial as a way of examining Moll’s increasing reliance on pathological
models of occultism during the early twentieth century. Finally, I will turn brieﬂy to the
defence mounted by Berlin’s occult community, who sought to undermine the credibility
of Moll’s critiques of their aspiring science by using his own tactics against him. In
adopting this approach I hope to achieve some balance between Moll’s own view of
35 Christoph Schr¨ oder, ‘Pseudo-Entlarvung: Ein kritischer Beitrag zur “Medien”-Entlarvungs-Tatik (Teil C)’,
Psychische Studien, 51 (1924), 664–6.
36 Ibid., 666.
37 Kr¨ oner, op. cit. (note 4), 167. For a more detailed analysis of how such pathologisation strategies were used
against deviant epistemologies like parapsychology, see Andreas Sommer’s article in this special issue.
38 Barbara Wolf-Braun, ‘Parapsychologische und psychiatrische Konstruktionen des Mediumismus um 1900’,
in Marcus Hahn and Erhard Sch¨ uttpelz (eds), Trancemedien und Neue Medien um 1900 (Bielefeld: Transcript,
2009), 150; see also Barbara Wolf-Braun (ed.), Medizin, Okkultismus und Parapsychologie im 19. und fr uhen
20. Jahrhundert (Wetzlar: GWAB Verlag, 2009).
39 The term ‘boundary work’ and related ones such as ‘epistemic contest’ and ‘sanitisation’ are derived from
recent works in the sociology of knowledge and science, which seek to describe the manner in which borders
between ﬁelds of knowledge are created, demarcated, contested, and secured. See Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural
Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).284 Heather Wolram
himself as a kind of scientiﬁc St George, and that of Germany’s parapsychologists who
tended to demonise Moll and those, including Max Dessoir and Albert Hellwig, who chose
to support him during the Rudloff–Moll trial.
`Trick' and `Manipulation': Psychological Responses to Occultism
During the ﬁrst iteration of the Rudloff–Moll trial in July 1925, the psychiatrist and
aspiring parapsychologist Paul S¨ unner took the stand in support of the plaintiff, Hermann
Rudloff. S¨ unner, who had acted as one of Frau Vollhardt’s controls during the 11 April
1923 sitting, testiﬁed under oath and in contradiction of Schwab’s version of events,
which Moll had used to mount his attack on Berlin’s occultists, that he had taken hold
of the medium’s hand while the room was still light and that he had maintained his grip
on this appendage throughout the darkened sitting; the hand with which he gripped Frau
Vollhardt was also that on which the ‘materialised’ hoop later appeared.40 If, as one of the
occultists commentating on this trial argued, one did not believe that S¨ unner had perjured
himself, how did one explain the appearance of the hoop on his arm, other than through
materialisation? In response to this problem, Moll, who had claimed that the medium’s
phenomena were a result of ‘trick’ and ‘manipulation’, did not attempt to cast doubt on
S¨ unner’s truthfulness but sought instead to invalidate his testimony and that of the other
control, Carl Bruck, through a piece of courtroom theatre.41
Blindfolding the judge, Herr Bornemann, Moll took hold of one of his subject’s hands
with both of his, pressing all three appendages onto a table.42 Maintaining the same
pressure on the judge’s hand, he used one of his hands to pick up a beech tree branch
that had been hidden on the ﬂoor and laid it on the table; following this he replaced
his hand upon that of Herr Bornemann, where it remained until after the blindfold was
removed.43 The judge, as he subsequently told the court, had not perceived the removal of
Moll’s hand from his own during the experiment and was thus astounded to see the branch
upon the table.44 Moll also made clear in his testimony that he had demonstrated this
and similar tricks at a small number of clubs and societies throughout Berlin.45 This was
signiﬁcant, he maintained, because one of these events had been attended by Dr Vieregge,
a participant in the 11 April 1923 sitting. According to Moll, Dr Vieregge had not been
able to ﬁgure out how the trick was carried out even though he examined the hoops Moll
had used for close to an hour; in the end Moll had had to explain it to him.46 While those
occultists who supported Rudloff were less than impressed by the defendant’s theatrical
coup or his denigration of Dr Vieregge’s intellect, this did not stop Moll from using these
same experiments in subsequent proceedings,47 in order to show how easily a medium’s
controls, in this case S¨ unner and Bruck, could be made to fall victim to a deception of the
senses.48
40 Dreher, op. cit. (note 31), 549.
41 Ibid., 549.
42 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 554.
43 Dreher, op. cit. (note 31), 549.
44 Ibid., 549.
45 Moll had sought to debunk Vollhardt’s phenomena at talks held at the Berlin Forensic-Medicine Club (26
October 1923) and the Berlin Urania (6 November 1923); see, Moll, op. cit. (note 27), 67.
46 ‘Prozeß-Urteil Moll–Rudloff’, op. cit. (note 2), 554; Moll, op. cit. (note 2), 42.
47 On Moll’s experiment with District Court Judge Pusch in the second edition of the Rudloff–Moll trial; see
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Sensory deception, along with distraction and expectation, were the central explanatory
tools in Moll’s initial attempts to come to terms with the occult in the closing decades
of the nineteenth century. It was during the late 1880s and early 1890s that Moll ﬁrst
became interested in spiritualism, mesmerism and other forms of occult phenomena,
including clairvoyance. According to Moll, his curiosity had been inspired, not only by
spiritualist sittings in the resort town of Spindelm¨ uhle in 1888, but also during his time as
a young doctor in Paris, where he had visited a wide range of occult practitioners.49 While
Moll admitted that he was often strongly inﬂuenced by these strange experiences and
could not initially explain them, he maintained that further deliberation on the problem
always revealed the cause of the phenomena he had witnessed.50 In the Spindelm¨ uhle
case, for example, where he had been involved in table rapping and turning, Moll’s close
examination of the table convinced him that its ostensibly purposeful movements had been
achieved through manual means.51 In another instance in which a table communicated
his name and other information about him that was unknown to others in the room, Moll
discovered that he himself had provided this information through the unconscious pressure
he had exerted on the table with his hands.52 Once Moll returned to Berlin, he continued
his study of this ﬁeld by attending the spiritualist club Psyche and visiting many of the
city’s most famous mediums and conjurers. In so doing, the young physician became
ever more scientiﬁcally preoccupied with the phenomena of occultism and its habitual
bedfellow, hypnotism; a preoccupation that from the late 1880s Moll was able to indulge in
the Berliner Gesellschaft f ur Experimental-Psychologie [Berlin Society for Experimental
Psychology].53 It was as part of this society that Moll and his friend, the psychologist
and philosopher Max Dessoir, both of whom were involved in efforts to promote the
psychological and medical use of hypnosis during the 1880s and 1890s, published some of
their ﬁrst efforts at a psychology of occult belief. Unlike experimental psychologists, such
as Wilhelm Wundt, who maintained that all occult phenomena resulted from fraud and
were therefore unworthy of scientiﬁc analysis, Moll and Dessoir felt compelled to explore
the psychological reasons that so many seemingly rational people were convinced of the
reality of such phenomena.54 Building on the work of the physiologist Wilhelm Preyer and
the psychologist Hugo M¨ unsterberg, who had attempted to explain thought transference
as the result of unconscious physical cues, the two men looked to the art of conjuring and
the psychology of observation for answers.55
In the ﬁrst incarnation of the Rudloff–Moll trial, many of those who acted as witnesses
for the defence did so in their capacity as experts on conjuring, arguing that the hoop
49 Moll, op. cit. (note 4), 92–4.
50 Ibid., 94.
51 Ibid., 92–3.
52 Ibid., 92–4.
53 Ibid., 94. See also Adolf Kurzweg, ‘Die Geschichte der Berliner “Gesellschaft f¨ ur Experimental-Psychologie”
mit besonderer Ber¨ ucksichtigung ihrer Ausgangssituation und des Wirkens von Max Dessoir’ (unpublished MD
thesis: FU Berlin, 1976).
54 Barbara Wolf-Braun, ‘Zur Rezeptionsgeschichte der Parapsychologie im Rahmen der akademischen
Psychologie: Die Stellungnahmen von Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) und Hugo M¨ unsterberg (1863–1916)’, in
J¨ urgen Jahnke et al. (eds), Psychologiegeschichte|Beziehungen zu Philosophie und Grenzgebieten (Munich:
Proﬁl Verlag, 1998), 410; Heather Wolffram, ‘Parapsychology on the Couch: The Psychology of Occult Belief
in Germany, c. 1870–1939’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 42 (2006), 237–60: 241–2.
55 Wilhelm Preyer, ‘Telepathie und Geisterseherei in England’, Deutsche Rundschau, 26 (1886), 30–51; Wolf-
Braun, op. cit. (note 54), 408–9. The approach adopted by Moll and Dessoir had much in common with that of
Joseph Jastrow in the United States; see Deborah Coon, ‘Testing the Limits of Sense and Science: American
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phenomenon, as Moll had maintained in Der Spiritismus, was a trick well known by stage
magicians.56 Moll’s expertise in this area had begun to grow during the late 1880s and
early1890s,whenthespiritualistDrEgbertM¨ ullerintroducedhim,notonlytoanumberof
Berlin’s best mediums, but also to escape artists and conjurers, whom the young physician
was able to study closely.57 The tricks he learnt from these performers allowed Moll, so he
claimed, to feign many of the most common spiritualist phenomena. Perhaps the simplest
and most effective of these tricks was the freeing of the hands from one’s controls. In 1892,
Moll explained this mediumistic manipulation in detail, responding to a publication by
Cesare Lombroso in which the criminologist claimed to have witnessed some signiﬁcant
physical phenomena in the presence of the medium Eusapia Paladino. As Moll explained,
while the medium may have linked her ﬁngers with those of her controls in full light,
once the room was darkened it was a fairly simple matter for her to free one of her hands
without alerting the control; this person’s ﬁngers would be brought in contact with those of
the control on the medium’s other side.58 This was more than just dexterity, Moll claimed,
it was an understanding that in the dark, one’s sense of touch and perceptive abilities are
not as acute as they are in full light; a fact that was conﬁrmed for Moll as he watched some
of the best observers he knew fall victim to this trick.59
While testimony about the manner in which this sleight of hand was achieved was no
doubt central to Moll’s defence in his July 1925 trial, both he and Dessoir had become
aware as early as the 1890s that the art of conjuring and the psychology of observation
were by no means mutually exclusive; indeed this was evident in Moll’s description of
the freeing of Paladino’s hands, with its reference to the effect of darkness on the senses.
This recognition had been made even more explicit, however, in 1890 when Dessoir, who
appeared as an expert witness for the defence in the Rudloff–Moll trial, published an
article in the political monthly Nord und S ud [North and South], in which he used an
exploration of conjuring in order to cast light on spiritualist belief. Dessoir maintained
that the conjurer and, by association, the spiritualist medium, were less reliant on their
manual dexterity than they were on their understanding of the psychology of association
andimitation,whichallowedthemtodistractanddeceivetheiraudiences.60 Dessoirwrote,
‘In the majority of cases, the observer is deceived neither through actual sleight of hand
nor through deception of the senses; rather, in a more reﬁned manner he causes himself to
be deceived through lapses of attention and errors of interpretation.’61 Moll, for his part,
concentrated on the difﬁculties of making accurate observations in conditions in which
there was inadequate light and in which distraction and expectation played an important
role.Inconsideringtheseproblemsaswellasthepsychologicalimpactofthes´ eanceroom,
Moll was reliant on his knowledge, not only of conjuring and the limits of observation, but
also of hypnosis and suggestion.
56 Dreher, op. cit. (note 31), 550.
57 Moll, op. cit. (note 4), 94–5.
58 Ibid., 95–7.
59 Ibid., 96.
60 Max Dessoir, ‘Zur Psychologie der Taschenspielerkunst’, Nord und S ud, 52 (1890), 207–8, 212. For further
discussion of Moll’s analysis of conjuring; see Soﬁe Lachapelle, ‘From the Stage to the Laboratory: Magicians,
Psychologists, and the Science of Illusion’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 44 (2008),
319–34.
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Moll was deeply involved in efforts during the late nineteenth century to have hypnosis
accepted as a legitimate medical therapy, that is, as a system of psychotherapeutics and
as a tool of psychological investigation. This project was hindered, however, by the
medical and public perception that a close relationship existed between medical hypnosis
and various forms of lay practice, including Heilmagnetismus [Magnetic Healing] and
occultism. This perception was based, not only on the apparent similarity between the
techniques applied by both medical and lay practitioners, but also on the fact that itinerant
lay hypnotists, such as the Dane Carl Hansen, had been responsible for introducing
German doctors to hypnosis during the late 1870s.62 As both Barbara Wolf-Braun and
Jens-Uwe Teichler have argued, the desire to sanitise hypnosis, that is, divorce it from
both lay practice and occultism, and prove its therapeutic and psychological utility, led
researchers, such as Moll and Dessoir, to wield hypnosis as a weapon of enlightenment.63
Moll, for instance, argued that suggestion explained the putative cures of Christian
Science, as well as the apparently supernormal rapport between magnetisers and their
somnambulists.64 Both men also used hypnotic suggestion as a means of exploring the
psychology of occult belief.65 Dessoir, whose work with hypnosis had led him to postulate
the existence of a Doppel-Ich [Double Ego], used this idea to explain the ostensibly
discrete personalities exhibited by mediums while in trance. While spiritualists interpreted
these personalities as the spirits of the departed, Dessoir maintained that they were
evidence of double consciousness.66 Moll’s experiments in hypnosis around the same
time (the 1890s) allowed him to show that post-hypnotic suggestion could be used to
give the impression of veridical thought transference.67 He also used hypnosis to explain
how intelligent, educated people could be led to believe they had witnessed mediumistic
phenomena. He argued that the hypnotic atmosphere of the darkened s´ eance room and
the suggestive effect of the experimenters’ social and scientiﬁc prestige could be used
to explain why seemingly rational people vouchsafed occult phenomena.68 This use of
hypnosis, as a light against the superstitious darkness spread by occultism, had two
advantages. On the one hand, it enabled Moll and Dessoir to further legitimise hypnosis as
a tool of psychological introspection, as part of the so-called ‘hypnosis battle’, and on the
other, it enabled them to claim the problems posed by occult phenomena and occult belief
as ones best dealt with by the psychologist.69
62 Jens-Uwe Teichler, ‘Der Charlatan strebt nicht nach Wahrheit, er verlangt nur nach Geld’, Zur
Auseinandersetzung zwischen naturwissenschaftlicher Medizin und Laienmedizin im deutschen Kaiserreich am
Beispiel von Hypnotismus und Heilmagnetismus (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2002), 31.
63 Barbara Wolf-Braun ‘“Was jeder Sch¨ aferknecht macht, ist eines Arztes unw¨ urdig”: Zur Geschichte der
Hypnose im wilhelminischen Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik (1888–1932)’, Hypnose und Kognition,
17 (2000), 134–52: 144. Teichler, op. cit. (note 62), 170–84.
64 Albert Moll, Gesundbeten: Medizin und Okkultismus (Berlin: Hermann Walther, 1902); Albert Moll, Der
Rapport in der Hypnose: Untersuchungen  uber den tierischen Magnetismus (Leipzig: Ambrosius Abel, 1892).
65 For a closer analysis of the development of the psychology of occult belief in the German context, see
Wolffram, op. cit. (note 54).
66 Albert Moll, Hypnotism, 4th edn (London: Walter Scott, 1897), 416.
67 Moll, op. cit. (note 2), 32; Moll, op. cit. (note 66), 277.
68 Moll, op. cit. (note 27), 87, 96.
69 Moll and Dessoir were engaged here in a kind of double boundary work, seeking, not only to sanitise hypnosis,
which in the German context was associated with lay performers and Heilmagnetismus, but also to expand
psychology’s jurisdiction and authority into territory claimed by the occultists. For more on boundary work in
this area, see Wolffram, op. cit. (note 33); David J. Hess, Science in the New Age: The Paranormal, Its Defenders
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By the time he came to write Der Spiritismus in 1924, Moll had used this kind of
psychological explanation for occultism – with its emphasis on hypnotic suggestion as
well as the limits of attention, the problems of expectation and the dangers of distraction
– innumerable times. Indeed, his attempts to bring light to realms made murky by occult
obfuscation had appeared in a wide range of newspapers, popular periodicals and scholarly
journals by the mid-1920s. Moll could, therefore, have been forgiven for experiencing
some frustration when he read Schwab’s protocol from 11 April 1923, which made
apparent just how little impact such work had had on Berlin’s occultists. The Vollhardt
case highlighted, not only the methodological failings of these occultists, which included
a failure to search the medium before the sitting, but also pointed, according to Moll,
to their complete neglect of the psychology of observation.70 As Moll argued, many
occult protocols, including Schwab’s, reported the appearance of phenomena that had been
produced only after a long duration spent in a room illuminated only by a dim red light.
He complained that none of those researchers who claimed the reality of the occult had
attempted to test the limits of accurate observation under these conditions. Research by
R.W. Schulte, he explained, had shown that s´ eance participants often broke the s´ eance
circle without being aware of it and that, in the red light normally used to illuminate
such experiments, distance appeared much greater than it really was.71 Moll stated that
the failure to take such facts into consideration left leading occultists such as Bruck and
S¨ unner as credulous as new-born children when attending experiments with mediums like
Frau Vollhardt.72
In these circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising that Moll’s comments in Der
Spiritismus went beyond phenomenonological and psychological analysis of the events of
the 11 April 1923 sitting to suggest some kind of inadequacy in the scientiﬁc objectivity or
mental acuity of those who vouchsafed the medium’s phenomena. The problem, as Moll
described it in his book, was not that these occultists fell victim to sensory deception or the
tricks of seasoned conjurers – indeed given what Moll and Dessoir had discovered about
the psychology of observation such mistakes could be expected under the sub-optimal
conditions in which experiments with mediums were conducted – but that they were
completely without logic. Moll complained that the most frequent error of reason made
by occultists was the following: when someone thoroughly explained a particular occult
phenomenon in terms of manual manipulation, occultists were almost never capable of
conceding that this explanation could be used to elucidate another similar phenomenon.73
Moll’s demonstration of the beech-tree phenomenon with Judge Bornemann was a good
example of this. The occultists who were in attendance complained that the trick, as
performed in the courtroom, did not exactly replicate the circumstances in which Frau
Vollhardt had produced her beech-tree branch, and was thus an insufﬁcient explanation for
thephenomenon.74 Frustratedbysimilarinstancesofwhatheconsideredtobeirrationality
and pig-headedness, Moll had intimated in Der Spiritismus, and began to state more
explicitly in other works from the mid-1920s, not just a lack of logic and a skewed
understanding of the scientiﬁc method on the part of Germany’s occultists, but also some
70 Moll, op. cit. (note 27), 36.
71 Ibid., 36; R.W. Schulte, ‘Experimentalpsychologische Untersuchungen zur Pr¨ ufung der Kontrollbedingungen
bei okkultistischen Dunkelsitzungen’, Zeitschrift f ur kritischen Okkultismus, 1 (1926), 248.
72 Moll, op. cit. (note 27), 36.
73 Moll, op. cit. (note 2), 43.
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form of mental weakness or pathology. This was the line of argument he was to develop
with his accusation that the 11 April 1923 sitting had been ‘farcical’.
`Farce': The Evolution of a Pathology of Occult Belief
It was clear by the time of the Rudloff–Moll trial in the mid-1920s that the form
of boundary work that Moll and other researchers had employed during the 1890s to
distance emerging disciplines such as psychology and medical hypnosis from occultism
had been insufﬁcient to achieve their secondary aim, which was to claim occult questions
for themselves. Although the techniques of the late nineteenth century, that is, the
naturalisation and psychologisation of occult phenomena, were still useful during the
inter-war period, developments in the mental sciences, especially the idea of complexes,
enabled the mobilisation of another form of boundary work. This technique, which had
been used in a somewhat different fashion during the nineteenth century to undermine
the credibility of magnetic and spiritualist mediums, not only had the advantage of
maintaining the crucial distance between psychology, hypnosis and the occult, but also
of denying parapsychologists’ authority over the paranormal and transforming them into
the subjects of psychological or psychiatric analysis. This technique was pathologisation.
While Moll’s claim that the sitting with Frau Vollhardt had been a ‘farce’ was, on
its surface, a comment about the lack of methodological rigour practised by Berlin’s
leading occultists, the deeper implications of this statement were pathological; pointing
to his evolving interest in both undermining his opponents’ scientiﬁc objectivity and
ascertaining the mental peculiarities and problems to which this group of men were
subject. In Der Spiritismus he had written, for example, that the experiment with Vollhardt
and the ‘farcical conditions’ under which it was conducted were of interest only in
so far as they cast light on the occultists’ mental state.75 While in this publication he
allowed the reader to draw their own conclusions about the mental acuity, even sanity,
of Bruck, S¨ unner and their friends, it was clear that Moll had, by this time, begun to
consider the parapsychologists, rather than the phenomena they studied, as the objects
within the ﬁeld of parapsychology that most required analysis. However, before Moll
could embark properly upon the study of this occult pathology – that he and others were
later to call the ‘occult complex’ – he needed to provide evidence, not just of isolated
errors of judgement and oversights in methodology, but also of systemic and consistent
refusal to think rationally about occult phenomena, even in the face of overwhelming
evidence of sensory deception and fraud. Moll began, therefore, to highlight the persistent
methodological and logical errors committed by occult researchers and their lack of expert
knowledge of their own ﬁeld. His aim was to undermine parapsychologists’ scientiﬁc
objectivity by re-subjectifying them, that is, making explicit the manner in which their
vested interest in proving the reality of the phenomena of mediumship actively shaped the
process of knowledge production.76 This was the approach he took in all three parts of the
Rudloff–Moll trial, where his epistemic and methodological critique of parapsychology
was to lay the groundwork for his personal insult of particular parapsychologists.
Moll had several misgivings about the scientiﬁc methodology practised by occult
researchers. While these men maintained the conviction that the phenomena they
witnessed in the presence of mediums were neither artiﬁcial nor fraudulent, they
75 Moll, op. cit. (note 2), 42, 43.
76 Thank you to the anonymous reviewers of this paper who suggested that I highlight this other form of
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steadfastly refused, so Moll contended, to instigate the checks and controls that would
deﬁnitively prove this. In the case of the 11 April 1923 sitting, for example, the rooms
on either side of the s´ eance room were searched, while the s´ eance room along with the
medium and her daughter were not.77 Furthermore, according to Schwab, although this
of course was contested by Bruck and S¨ unner, control of the medium’s hands had not
been established until after the lights had been extinguished. In his running commentary
on Schwab’s protocol, Moll also noted the lack of crucial detail in this record of events.
While the protocol stated, for example, that the silhouettes of Dr S¨ unner and Dr Vieregge
were visible in the moonlight that came in through the curtains, no mention was made
of whether the medium or her daughter were visible.78 Similarly, although the protocol
maintained that the medium’s hands had been held tightly throughout the experiment, it
did not mention whether they had been pressed to the table-top throughout, and for Moll,
at least, this was the most signiﬁcant point.79
While the protocol lacked detail on crucial issues such as the control of the medium’s
hands, it did, as Moll pointed out, put undue emphasis on events and procedures that were
ultimately insigniﬁcant.80 Schwab’s protocol, for instance, gave details of the medium’s
pulse during and after the experiment held on 11 April 1923, while many other occult
protocols provided measurements of blood pressure or sensitivity to pain.81 Moll argued
that whether Frau Vollhardt’s pulse was sixty or seventy beats per minute after the sitting
was completely irrelevant; it served only to act suggestively on the reader and distract from
more important epistemic and methodological issues.82 Ultimately, Moll believed that
such details were part of an effort on the part of parapsychologists to lend their protocols
the aura of science.83 Given what Moll saw as the occultists’ superﬁcial precautions and
lackadaisical note-taking, which did nothing to exclude the possibility of fraud or sensory
deception, these irrelevant minutiae were incapable of convincing him of occultism’s
scientiﬁc legitimacy. What these irrelevancies did convince him of, however, was the
occultists’ lack of expertise or epistemic authority in their own ﬁeld.
During the Rudloff–Moll trial, Moll sought not only to demonstrate his opponents’
lack of scientiﬁc understanding, highlighting their careless methodology and faulty logic,
but also to contest their expert knowledge of the occult. He attempted, for example, to
undermine the litigant’s expert witnesses by pointing to what he contended were crucial
gaps in their knowledge of the parapsychological canon. Of Walther Kr¨ oner, who had been
produced by the prosecution to testify on the defendant’s introduction of a coarse tone of
77 Moll, op. cit. (note 2), 40.
78 Ibid., 37.
79 Ibid., 38.
80 In their defence against Moll’s attacks, which was mounted in a series of articles in the journals Psychische
Studien and Zeitschrift f ur Parapsychologie, parapsychologists claimed that the lack of precautions they took
in their experiments, including the decision not to search the medium or her helpers, were an unavoidable
consequence of the unpredictable and ill-understood nature of occult phenomena and their conduits, the
mediums. In the case of the 11 April 1923 sitting, Bruck stressed that this experiment had never been intended
to be deﬁnitive and that the participants had been quite aware that the conditions under which it was conducted
were such that sceptics would not ﬁnd the protocol convincing. The aim had simply been to introduce Bruck
and S¨ unner, who had never acted as controls before, to Vollhardt’s phenomena in conditions that mimicked those
in which she had performed successfully before. Moll, of course, was little persuaded by this argument, using
such protests to highlight the profound differences he saw between the science of the occultists and mainstream
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debate to the ﬁeld, Moll demanded, ‘Do you know the book by X?’, ‘Have you read the
article in Y?’ ad nauseam until the witness was quite ﬂustered.84 As the parapsychologist
Eberhard Buchner later noted, Moll had continued this barrage of questions until the
judge intervened, pointing out that Kr¨ oner was half Moll’s age and was thus naturally
less well-read than him.85 With this attack deﬂected, Moll now sought to discredit Kr¨ oner
and belittle his expertise by highlighting his practice as a magnetiser. In particular, Moll
claimed that Kr¨ oner had offered both magnetic diagnosis and healing at a distance; a
practice that was considered a dangerous form of charlatanry by medical authorities and
wasthereforeillegalunderGermanlaw;86 notonlywasKr¨ oneranignorant(‘Nichtwisser’)
but,accordingtoMoll,hewasalsoadangerouscharlatan.Moll’saimherewithKr¨ onerand
other witnesses was to highlight that what Germany’s parapsychologists called science,
and what they presented as scientiﬁc expertise and authority, in fact bore no resemblance
to the real thing; of which he, of course, was a true representative.
While the occultists involved in the Rudloff–Moll trial no doubt had reason to feel
aggrieved by Moll’s claims about the scientiﬁc legitimacy of their ﬁeld and their expert
knowledge of it, his attacks in the courtroom were relatively mild compared with those
he was to launch in his 1929 book Psychologie und Charakterologie der Okkultisten, in
which he wrote, among other things, ‘Different from the Others [Anders als die Andern] is
the name of a homosexual ﬁlm. Different from the others [anders als die Andern] are the
scientiﬁc practices of occultists.’87 Clearly this book took the denigration of the occultists’
scientiﬁc pretensions to another level, but its real signiﬁcance lay in its development of the
psychologicalanalysisofparapsychology’sproponentsthatMollhadhintedwasnecessary
in Der Spiritismus and during the Rudloff–Moll trial. The jurist Albert Hellwig, who acted
as an expert witness in this trial, led the attack on this front, postulating the problem of
occult research as one ultimately concerned with the researchers’ personalities, but Moll’s
Psychologie und Charakterologie der Okkultisten developed the psychological analysis
more fully.88 He wrote here, for instance, of his perplexity about the mental state of a
man like S¨ unner, who had signed Schwab’s protocol, vouchsafed the revised protocol of
Bruck, and yet swore in court that neither account was true. What, Moll asked, was one
supposed to think about a man who is ostensibly a leading scientiﬁc ﬁgure in his ﬁeld but
who rejects under oath protocols he himself signed or published?89 While the reader was
left in this instance to draw their own conclusions, the ﬁnal section of the book, entitled
‘ZurPsychopathologiederOkkultisten’[‘OnthePsychopathologyofOccultists’],leftlittle
doubt that Moll believed that S¨ unner and his colleagues were mentally unstable.
According to Moll, occultists suffered a range of inter-related mental problems.
Occultists were, he claimed, highly susceptible, not only to the suggestive atmosphere of
the s´ eance room, but also to a kind of paranoia, which made them both extraordinarily
credulous and overly defensive of their beliefs. Furthermore, many of them were
convinced, not just of the reality of a phenomenon they had experienced, say telepathy,
84 Ibid., 63.
85 Buchner, op. cit. (note 32), 159.
86 Ibid., 159; Moll, op. cit. (note 27), 64.
87 ‘“Anders als die Andern” heißt ein homosexueller Film. “Anders als die Andern” sind die Sitten der
Okkultisten in der Wissenschaft’; Moll, op. cit. (note 27), 69.
88 Albert Hellwig, ‘Psychologische Glossen zu dem Berliner Okkultistenprozeß’, Zeitschrift f ur kritischen
Okkultismus, 1 (1926), 54–61: 56. Hellwig’s participation in the Rudloff–Moll trial led to his becoming the
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but also of others they had no experience of, for example clairvoyance. As a concomitance
of this tendency, they also regularly situated themselves in opposition to whole areas of
accepted science, believing, without question, anything that ofﬁcial science had rejected.90
The expert witness Kr¨ oner, for example, Moll accused of being a biochemist, a homeopath
and a believer in clairvoyance, as well as a psychoanalyst and someone convinced of
a whole range of other occult phenomena, who attacked both the eating of meat and
vivisection.91 For Moll, this combination of credulity and combativeness pointed to an
‘occult complex’, a group of unacknowledged feelings and ideas that manifested in a
desire to prove the reality of the occult under all circumstances, a phenomenon that bore
a close resemblance to paranoid ideas.92 Moll went even further to identify compulsive
ideas, nervous disorder and psychopathy among various occultists, which in some cases
lent them such self-belief that they had a strong suggestive inﬂuence on those with whom
they came into contact, thereby spreading the occult contagion.93
The psychopathology that emerged in PsychologieundCharakterologiederOkkultisten
allowed Moll to dismiss his opponents and their epistemic claims on the basis that they
were mentally unstable. Indeed, Moll had become increasingly frustrated over the decades
atthelackofimpactthathispsychologyofoccultbelief,whichhadbeenbasedonresearch
into sense perception, suggestion and distraction, had had on the understanding of the
occult. He found that his new psychopathology enabled him, not only to undermine the
legitimacy of the entire ﬁeld, but also to transform its erstwhile proponents into objects
of study. These objects of Moll’s psychopathological gaze, did not, however, take this
attempt to destroy them lying down. Instead, they turned Moll’s tools of analysis against
him, seeking an ultimate cause for his irrational rejection of parapsychology.
`The Obscurantist': Parapsychologists' Responses to Moll's Critique
The anger of Germany’s parapsychologists about Der Spiritismus and their dissatisfaction
with the outcome of the July 1925 trial were, in large part, a result of the belief that Moll
had not only attempted, but had also been allowed to get away with, the sabotage of their
nascent science.94 For this reason, much of this trial and the subsequent proceedings were
taken up with arguments about the ‘coarse tone’ that Moll had used in Der Spiritismus,
and expert witnesses were asked to consider whether his comments constituted acceptable
scientiﬁc critique in the ﬁeld of parapsychology.95 While Judge Bornemann and the judge
presiding over the third set of proceedings tended to side with the parapsychologists,
asking that, in future, critics of occultism moderate their tone, they were not able to
punish Moll for his alleged lack of professionalism.96 It was left to the parapsychologists,
therefore, to highlight the error of Moll’s ways. In his discussion of Der Spiritismus
and the Rudloff–Moll trial, for example, the Berlin-based occultist and doctor Christoph
90 Ibid., 109.
91 Ibid., 109–10.
92 Ibid., 112–13.
93 Ibid., 114–15.
94 Dreher, op. cit. (note 31), 548.
95 Inhisautobiography,MollstatedthathehadshowninthecourseoftheRudlofftrialthattheparapsychologists,
in particular Kr¨ oner, were just as guilty of an unseemly tone in their polemics as he was; see, Moll, op. cit. (note
4), 106. In Psychologie und Charakterologie der Okkultisten he made a similar point, alluding to occultists’ use
of the threat of legal proceedings to prevent legitimate critique; see Moll, op. cit. (note 27), 58.
96 Anonymous, ‘Das Urteil des Kammergerichts in der Privatklagesache Rudloff gegen Moll’, Zeitschrift f ur
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Schr¨ oder pointed to Moll’s careless application of logic and his apparently unreﬂective
malice against the ﬁeld of occultism. Many of the arguments that Moll used against the
reality of occult phenomena, he argued, were the same arguments used by physicians
and psychologists during the late nineteenth century to object to the use of hypnosis.97
Moll, as one of the participants in this Hypnose-Kampf, should have some appreciation,
Schr¨ oder contended, of the difﬁculty of validating phenomena that, given the current state
of scientiﬁc knowledge, were little understood and hard to prove. Furthermore, using
Moll’s writing and expert testimony on the relationship between suggestion and memory,
Schr¨ oder was able to argue that Moll was so biased against the reality of occult phenomena
that his desire not to conﬁrm their reality had led to the falsiﬁcation or deception of his
memory.98 When such argument and analogy fell on deaf ears, however, parapsychologists
sought a new approach to the ‘obscurantist’ Albert Moll.99
Walther Kr¨ oner, who in his capacity as an expert witness in the Rudloff–Moll trial
had come under sustained attack from Moll, was one of the leading ﬁgures in the
parapsychologists’ counter-offensive.100 In his ‘EpilogzurMoll-Polemik’ [Epiloguetothe
Moll Polemic], for example, Kr¨ oner argued that Moll had used the trial to portray himself
as science’s champion. He wrote that Moll, in the guise of St George, appeared not only
to ﬁght for Germany’s scientiﬁc reputation, but also to bring light to areas darkened by
superstition, and rescue the freedom of scientiﬁc critique that the representatives of this
murky realm ostensibly threatened.101 Moll had demanded sittings under his control in
which the medium would be undressed and searched, in which the s´ eance circle would be
built under strict conditions, and in which the medium would not be seated in a medium
cabinet. According to Kr¨ oner, however, this was all bluff and bluster; a blatant attempt to
take advantage of both the judge’s and the public’s ignorance about the conditions under
which the phenomena of mediumship were possible.102 Moll claimed to have forty years
of experience and expertise in the ﬁeld of occultism, but if he were truly not aware after
all this time of the psychic instability and spontaneity of mediumship, Kr¨ oner argued, he
should return all the money he had received as an expert witness in this ﬁeld.103
Kr¨ oner’s argument intimated, without much subtlety, that Moll was well aware that
he was being dishonest, that he was purposefully misleading both the court and the
public, and that his purpose was self-aggrandisement; certainly, Kr¨ oner’s allusion to Moll
as St George aligns quite well with the presentation of self that is apparent in Moll’s
autobiography.104 What remained was to ask why Moll confused personal attack with
scientiﬁc critique; why he required the fame he so obviously sought and how he acquired
followers. The answer was to be found, according to Kr¨ oner, in Moll’s own peculiar
psychology, which manifested as a pathological aversion to the occult. Tarring Moll and
men such as Dessoir and Hellwig with the same brush, Kr¨ oner stated:
Itisthis,thepositionoftheMollschool,withtheirconfusionofheterogeneousconcepts–liketheequation
of personal questions, specialist questions and questions of principle – that gives the best typical example
97 Schr¨ oder, op. cit. (note 35), 664–6.
98 Ibid., 498.
99 Walther Kr¨ oner, ‘Parapsychologie und Psychoanalyse’, Zeitschrift f ur Parapsychologie, 2 (1926), 99–114.
100 On Moll’s attack on the parapsychologists, see Andreas Sommer’s paper in this issue.
101 Kr¨ oner, op. cit. (note 4), 160.
102 Ibid., 161.
103 Ibid., 161–2.
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of an emotional clouding of the judgement and through this doggedly held system of errors provides the
proof for their own neurotic-dogmatic views.105
Furthermore, Kr¨ oner wrote that Moll’s anti-occult complex was based around profound
feelings of inferiority. He was a man who, because of his mental and psychic inferiority,
continually met with refusal and resistance; this had led him to develop both a hate
complex and acute narcissism.106 Unfortunately, this narcissism lent Moll a suggestive
power that allowed him to convince others of his ideas, thus spreading what Kr¨ oner
chose to call the ‘Moll bacillus’.107 He ended his polemic by stating that he understood
why the Rudloff–Moll trial and the arguments it had fostered had caused some of his
colleagues to develop what might best be described as an ‘anti-Moll complex’ in their
writing, but this was an indulgence he urged them to give up. After all, Kr¨ oner said, what
psychologist would try to convince a neurotic woman of the error of her ways through
reasoned argument? Attempts to reason with Moll were equally futile, therefore occultists
should, he maintained, simply let the facts speak for themselves.108
Conclusions
The Rudloff–Moll case with its focus on Moll’s claims in Der Spiritismus of ‘trick’,
‘manipulation’ and ‘farce’ offers a way of considering, in microcosm, not only the
substance and the development of his critique of occultism but also the evolution of the
broader epistemic contest between psychology and parapsychology during the Kaiserreich
and Weimar Republic. The case reveals, I believe, several aspects of this contest. The
psychology of occult belief that Moll and his supporters utilised during the trial, for
instance, was in large part motivated by the desire of psychologists and medical hypnotists
during the 1880s and 1890s to distance their nascent disciplines and professional interests
from those of occultists. Certainly, this was Moll’s intention when he examined Christian
Science and the putative rapport between magnetisers and somnambulists at the turn of
the century. As in the Rudloff–Moll trial, however, where Moll felt compelled to go
beyond explanations of Vollhardt’s phenomena based on the study of conjuring and the
psychology of observation, this form of boundary work ultimately proved insufﬁcient
to wrench paranormal phenomena from the grasp of the occultists. For this task, as
Moll’s attacks in Der Spiritismus, the trial and Psychologie und Charakterologie der
Okkultisten proved, a more powerful weapon was required: pathologisation. Aided by
new psychological concepts such as ‘the complex’, Moll and his colleagues could, by the
1920s, both question the scientiﬁc objectivity, and impugn the mental health, of seemingly
rational people, transforming them from disciplinary rivals into objects of study. As the
Rudloff–Mollcasedemonstrates,however,thisdidnotbringtheepistemiccontestbetween
psychology and parapsychology to an end because parapsychologists responded to this
attack by pathologising their critics.
The Rudloff–Moll case, therefore, provides a record, not just of one of the many
confrontations Moll had with Germany’s parapsychologists, but also an overview of the
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Gleichsetzung von Personal-, Sach-, und Prinzipienfragen) das typische Beispiel einer affektiven Urteilstr¨ ubung
zum besten gibt und durch dieses z¨ ah festgehaltene Fehlleistungssystem den Beweis f¨ ur ihre neurotisch-
dogmatische Einstellung liefert’; Kr¨ oner, op. cit. (note 99), 103.
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evolution of his thought about the occult, and an insight into the problems surrounding
both psychology’s and parapsychology’s claims to scientiﬁc status and authority during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While the case reveals many of the ﬂaws
in the occultists’ methodology and logic, it also casts light on Moll’s sense of self and
his preferred style of scientiﬁc debate, neither of which reﬂect well on him. Undoubtedly,
Moll did see himself as a kind of ‘scientiﬁc St George’, and he was not concerned about
insulting, offending, defaming or ignoring those he felt were his ideological enemies and
intellectual inferiors. What this makes clear is that, despite Moll’s claim to be a man of
reason and a representative of science, he ultimately did not feel that he could, as Kr¨ oner
had counselled, let the facts speak for themselves; he felt compelled to resort to an attack
that would annihilate both the credibility of his opponents and their putative science.